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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Juan Santos-Quintero,

him

guilty 0f assault, battery, unlawful use of a ﬁrearm,

Santos—Quintero argues the

Statement

Of The

On

Facts

He

It

was

(T12, p.37,

line.

He was behind

down behind

Ls.21-25.)

He

thought

window, somebody raised a gun out the

He

down

followed the small car

13, p.43, Ls. 14-19.)

grade school.

The
the house.

1

t0 put

.

it

was not going very

fast,

was a drunk

(Tr., p.37,

window and

.

the

way into

car pulled

Firth

up

still

up and

it

a small “bluish-green” car With a White driver’s

some space between

The small

(Tr., p.40,

driver,

all

.

after hunting.

a white Ford pickup. (T12, p.37, Ls.6-9.)

driver.

Gentillon pulled up closer to the small car, “all 0f a sudden

Gentillon slowed

sun was

either late in the afternoon or evening, but the

(TL, p.37, Ls.14-20.) The small car

side door.

trial.

And Course Of The Proceedings

noticed the White pickup slow

As

erroneously admitted hearsay evidence at the bench

district court

(Tr., p.39, Ls.6-1 1.)

light outside.

yellow

and a persistent Violator enhancement.

September 21, 2018, Lamon Gentillon drove out of Wolverine Canyon

(TL, p.37, Ls.6-9.1)

was

appeals from the judgment entered after the district court found

Jr.,

his car

.

but

.

.

it

was crossing

the

Ls.21-25.)

out the driver’s side

started shooting.”

(Tr., p.38, Ls.1-4.)

and the small

(Tr., p.40, Ls.5-9.)

car.

and called 911 While he drove. (TL, p.40, Ls. 10-

to a residence right next to the south parking lot

of a

Ls.23-25.)

Juan Santos-Quintero,

(TL, p.42, L.19

—

p.43, L.2.)

A11 transcript citations refer t0 the

Jr.,

got out 0f the small car and walked to the back of

A woman

trial transcript.

also got out 0f the car.

(TL, p.43, Ls.7-8.)

Gentillon stayed at the house until Ofﬁcers Howell, Katseanes, and
t0 Gentillon’s

911

When Ofﬁcer Van Orden
asked

who was

L.11 — p.50, L.5;

(T12, p.49,

call.

arrived,

in the house, but the

p.100, Ls.14-22.)

PA

Using the

(Tr., p.59,

Tr., p.52,

L.21

t0 call in the

Ofﬁcer Van Orden

person

at the

may come

any

details.”

(TL,

come

out.

(TL, p.59, Ls.2-9.)

Ls.19-20.) Eventually, the

called out for a While

woman came out of the house,
(Tr.,

arrive.

(Tr., p.61,

spoke

p.147, Ls.1-4.) Ofﬁcer

to

hold the

L.16 — p.62, L.13.)

took a perimeter position behind a tree Where he could watch

that

(Tr.,

He

and he and the other ofﬁcers spread out

STAR team t0

(Tr., p.99,

same time.”

.

Ofﬁcer Katseanes identiﬁed the ofﬁcers and

up off the corner of the house” so
0fthe house

.

car,

initially

the back door 0f the house.

.

system in his

STAR team}

perimeter while waiting for the

— p.53, L9.)

able to provide

With Deputy Katseanas, and identiﬁed herself as Denise Williams.

Howell decided

in response

he found the owner of the house in the driveway and

homeowner “wasn’t

instructed the individuals in the house to

without any response.

ﬂ

Van Orden came

Ls.7-12, p.103, Ls.1 1-14.)

He

later

moved

t0 a “position

he could “watch the front of the house and watch the rear

He was “concerned at this point that another

p.105, Ls.1 1- 1 6.)

out the front 0f the house and try t0

ambush Deputy Katseanes While he was

dealing with [Williams].” (Tr., p.105, Ls.17-19.)

Ofﬁcer Van Orden saw “movement
10.)

It

at the

back door 0f the residence.”

looked like “somebody had brieﬂy peeked out the doorway and was going back into the

residence.” (Tr., p.106, Ls.5-10.)

out with your hands up.

He

started

moving toward

Show me your hands.”

(Tr.,

the back door while yelling,

The

STAR team is the

Southeast Idaho version of a

“Come

p.106, Ls.15-23.) Ofﬁcer Katseanas heard

Ofﬁcer Van Orden shouting commands and ran toward the back 0f the house.

2

(Tr., p. 106, Ls.5-

SWAT team.

(Tr., p.61,

(Tr.,

p.155, Ls. 10-

L.25 — p.62, L.2.)

Van Orden and Katseanas

14.)

Ofﬁcers

(T12,

p.155, L.22

— p.156,

decided t0 take cover behind a tree toward the backyard.

L.2.)

Ofﬁcer Howell also heard Ofﬁcer Van Orden shouting commands. (TL, p.63, L.24 — p.64,
L.3.)

He

ran from the front yard to the backyard. (TL, p.63, L.24

the backyard, he kept his eye

0n the back door and moved

was moving, he saw a muzzle

blast

8.)

The

bullet entered his

(T12, p.69,

He

for cover.

into

As he

(T12, p.66, Ls.1-4.)

the left side, hit his spine, and lodged in his abdominal wall.

He

instantly lost his breath

could not see any blood, but his hip

over and returned ﬁre.

As he came

p.64, L.3.)

out the back door and heard a gunshot. (TL, p.66, Ls. 1 -

L.4 — p.70, L.19, p.86, Ls.6-17.)

p.66, Ls.1-4.)

He rolled

body 0n

come

—

felt like it

and

hit the

was broken. (TL,

ground. (TL,

p.67, Ls.6-10.)

(Tr., p.67, Ls.6-10.)

Ofﬁcer Van Orden also saw a puff 0f White smoke from the back door and heard gunshots.
(Tr.,

p.107, L.16

ﬁred, Ofﬁcer

—

p.108, L.4.)

Van Orden

p.1 13, Ls.1 1-17.)

He

could not see Ofﬁcer Howell, but after the ﬁrst shots were

heard Ofﬁcer Howell

Ofﬁcer Van Orden ﬁred

door in an attempt to “stop the threat.”
see if he

was

alright.

L.21

(Tr., p.1 15,

make

a “grunt or a noise that sounded 0f

— p.1 16,

L.1.)

He

then yelled

at

(Tr.,

0f the back

his patrol riﬂe several times t0 the right

(Tr., p.1 14, Ls.8-19.)

.”

Ofﬁcer Howell

Ofﬁcer Howell responded

that

t0

he had been

shot. (Tr., p.1 16, Ls.2-6.)

Concerned

Ofﬁcer Howell might be shot again, Ofﬁcer Van Orden

that

run t0 Ofﬁcer Howell’s

aid.

(Tr., p.1 16, Ls.2-16.)

Ofﬁcer Howell across the backyard
Katseanas

at the tree.

(Tr., p.1 18,

another handful 0f gunshots that

continued t0 hold the perimeter.

t0 safety.

Ls.11

—

(Tr.,

cover t0

Ofﬁcer Van Orden provided cover and helped

(Tr., p.1 17,

p.1 19, L.6.)

came from

left his

Ten

the house.”

p.166, Ls.3-5.)

Ls.14-23.)

to ﬁfteen

(Tr.,

He

then rejoined Deputy

minutes

later,

p.119, Ls.17-21.)

“there

was

The ofﬁcers

The

STAR team

p.166, Ls.3-8.)

started trickling in

and helped

Members 0f the STAR team were

t0

hold the perimeter as they arrived. (TL,

able to reach Santos—Quintero

an attempt to negotiate a surrender. (TL, p.3 14, L. 12 — p.315, L.12.)
out “because he

was

afraid [the ofﬁcers]

the

He told the STAR team that he had taken the magazine

magazine

in the kitchen.

initially

(TL, p.321, Ls.14-20.)

He

his phone. (TL, p.323, Ls.1-15.) Santos—Quintero then

one hand and an alcoholic beverage in the

come

cell

phone

in

come

refused t0

would shoot him because he shot a police

p.315, Ls.15-20.) Eventually, however, Santos—Quintero agreed t0

15.)

He

by

officer.” (Tr.,

(TL, p.323, Ls.1-

out.

out of his gun and placed the gun and

also said he

wanted

t0

come

came out 0f the house with a

other. (TL, p.323, Ls.1-18.)

out holding

cell

phone

in

Ofﬁcer Katseanas tackled

Santos-Quintero and placed him in handcuffs. (TL, p.169, Ls.13-24.)

Immediately
t0

make

sure there

after the ofﬁcers

was no one

took Santos—Quintero into custody, they “cleared the house

else in the house.” (TL, p. 1 7 1 , Ls.3-7.)

check[]” and then did a “deep clear”

by looking

anywhere. Crawlspaces. Every—everywhere.”
house.

(TL, p.171, Ls.21-24.)

casings. (TL, p.171, L.25

The
assault,

state

in “the cabinets,

(T12,

The ofﬁcers found

— p.172,

They started with an “initial
any — under beds, couches,

p.171, Ls.16-20.)

Nobody

else

was

in the kitchen a gun, a magazine,

in the

and

shell

L.4., p.192, Ls.8-19.)

charged Santos—Quintero With aggravated battery, two counts of aggravated

unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm, an enhancement for using a ﬁrearm during the

commission of a

felony,

September 21, 2018.

and an enhancement for being a persistent Violator

(R., pp.52-58.)

The

state also

all

for the shooting

on

charged Santos—Quintero with grand theft

because, the state alleged, Santos—Quintero possessed the gun he used in the shooting “knowing
the property to have been stolen.” (R., p.54.) Santos—Quintero

waived

the case proceeded t0 a trial in front of the district court. (R., p.21

1.)

his right t0 a jury trial,

and

At

trial,

Joshua Fuhriman testiﬁed

that, just a

items stolen from his car in a Walmart parking
items stolen was a Ruger

9E

pistol.

lot.

few days before the shooting, he had some

(TL, p.29, Ls.18-23, p.31, Ls.2-3.)

(TL, p.29, L.24

—

p.30,

L3.) Fuhriman identiﬁed the gun

recovered from the kitchen on the day ofthe shooting as his Ruger 9E. (TL, p.3 1, L.9
Williams, the

woman who had been

shooting, also took the stand at the

state. (Tr.,

her to

p.235, L.23

testify.

(Tr.,

— p.236,

L.9.)

p.235, L.23

in the car With Santos—Quintero

Yet she refused t0
L.22.)

found that Williams qualiﬁed as “unavailable”

The

testify,

even

district court

to testify

in

held Williams in contempt and

— p.244, L21.)

an interview With Detective Medrano.

Santos-Quintero objected t0 the admission of the hearsay statements.
state

0n the day of the

after the district court ordered

In light 0f Williams refusing t0 testify, the state called Detective

What Williams said

L. 1 .)

under the rules of evidence because she

refused to testify despite a court order to do so. (TL, p.241, L.21

testify as to

— p.32,

receiving a subpoena and use immunity from the

trial after

— p.241,

One of the

Medrano
(Tr.,

to the stand t0

p.244, Ls.23-24.)

(TL, p.248, Ls.6-7.)

The

argued the hearsay was admissible as statements made by Williams that were against her

interest.

(TL, p.252, L.23

— p.253,

L.1.)

The

district court

decided to hear the testimony ﬁrst and

then decide afterward whether the testimony ﬁt in an exception t0 the rule against hearsay.
p.253, Ls.18-21.)

Walmart parking

Detective

lot.

Medrano

testiﬁed that she asked Williams about the theft in the

(TL, p.255, Ls.14-21.)

Santos-Quintero were in the Walmart parking

know What he

(Tr.,

lot

Williams told Detective Medrano that she and

and “that he did go

to a vehicle” but “she didn’t

took.” (Tr., p.255, Ls.14-21.)

After Detective Medrano’s testimony, the district court asked each side about the

requirement in the “Statement Against Interest” exception that the statement must be “supported

by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate

its

trustworthiness.” (TL, p.258, L.22

— p.259,

L.3, p.261, L.24

that a

— p.262,

The

L.3.)

gun was stolen from a car

often together.

state

in the

(TL, p.259, Ls.4-18.)

argued that the statements were corroborated by testimony

Walmart parking

and

lot

that

Williams and Santos were

Santos-Quintero argued the state had not satisﬁed the

corroboration requirement because, in his View, Williams had t0 present corroborating evidence
t0 Detective

Medrano during

the interview. (T12, p.262, Ls.4-16.)

against Santos: “Well, we’ve heard testimony about the

car.”

(TL, p.262,

Ls.17-18.)

corroboration because Detective

Walmart parking

district court

stolen, that

it

Medrano had not

“nailed

down

ﬁrearm was

as t0

stolen.

in

Mr. Fuhriman’s

When

they were in the

(TL, p.263, Ls.3-8.)

decided to reserve ruling on the hearsay statement until

district court

was

pushed back

argued that did not constitute sufﬁcient

Santos—Quintero

lot in relation to the date” the

gun

The

it

The

heard the rest of the

evidence. (Tr., p.272, Ls.5-8.)

At

the end of the state’s presentation 0f evidence, the district court ruled

0n the hearsay

statement:

Having reviewed the testimony of the

detective, the unavailability

0f Denise

Williams under 804, the Court does ﬁnd that she was unavailable and that the
exception under (b)(3) applies.

Under

(b)(3)(A),

I

note that the requirements under (b)

— under 3(A)

are in the

disjunctive.

And

so the statement that Ms. Williams

made

to the detective is a statement that a

would have made only if the person
tended t0 expose the declarant to civil

reasonable person in the declarant’s position
believed

it

to

be true because, When made,

it

0r criminal liability.

In this case, the statements that she issued could expose her t0 criminal liability.

And,

therefore, the Court

ﬁnds the exception

to apply.

(TL, p.422, Ls.8-21.) The district court went 0n to
the sentencing

p.460, L.25.)

enhancement and

The only time

laid out its

ﬁnd Santos—Quintero

ﬁndings in painstaking

guilty

detail.3

0n all counts except
(Tr.,

p.445, L.19

the district court referred to Williams’s hearsay statement

analysis of the grand theft charge. (TL, p.458, L.5

was

—

in its

— p.459, L20.)

Santos—Quintero timely appealed. (R., pp.279-8 1 .)

3

The

district court

dismissed the sentencing enhancement because the prosecutor did not include

a date in the charging document. (TL, p.461, L.1

— p.462,

L.6.)

ISSUE
Santos—Quintero states the issue 0n appeal

as:

Did

When

the district court abuse

discretion

its

it

admitted Detective Medrano’s

testimony describing Ms. Williams’ statements, because the district court applied a

wrong standard

to determine

whether the statements should be admitted?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Santos—Quintero
Williams

’

s

failed to

hearsay statement?

show

the district court abused

its

discretion

by admitting

ARGUMENT
The

District

A.

Court Did Not Abuse

Its

Discretion

BV Admitting Williams’s Hearsay

Introduction

Santos-Quintero has failed to show the

district court

abused

its

the statement against interest exception t0 Williams’s statement that she

in the

Statement

Walmart parking

lot

When he took an unknown item

case, the statement against interest exception applies

interest

and other evidence

discretion

when

it

applied

was With Santos—Quintero

out 0f someone’s car.

where the statement

is

In a criminal

against the declarant’s

in the record corroborates the statement such that a reasonable person

could believe the statement.

Santos—Quintero does not challenge the district court’s ﬁnding that

Williams’s statement was against her interest 0r argue that the record does not actually corroborate
Williams’s statement. Instead, he argues only that the

district court

applied the

wrong standard by

admitting the evidence Without ﬁrst expressly ﬁnding the evidence in the record sufﬁciently

corroborated Williams’s statement such that a reasonable person could believe

While the

district court

did not expressly state that the evidence sufﬁciently corroborated

Williams’s statement, this Court can readily infer that the
that ﬁnding.

The

district court

importantly, this

facts that

was a bench

Santos—Quintero of grand

trial

theft.

district court at least implicitly

made

read the corroboration requirement t0 both parties and asked each

party Whether the state had satisﬁed that requirement.

emphasized a number 0f

it.

trial,

the district court also

tended to corroborate Williams’s statement.

and the

The

During the

district court relied

district court’s reliance

Perhaps most

on Williams’s statement

to convict

0n Williams’s statement proves

that

the district court thought the evidence in the record sufﬁciently corroborated Williams’s statement

such that a reasonable person could believe Williams’s statement. Because
the district court applied the correct standard, the district court did not abuse

this

its

Court can infer

discretion.

B.

Standard

“‘The

Of Review

trial

court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of evidence and

decision to admit evidence will be reversed only
discretion.”’

State V. Folk, 162 Idaho 620, 625,

when

its

there has been a clear abuse 0f that

402 P.3d 1073, 1078 (2017) (quoting

State V.

Lopez-Orozco, 159 Idaho 375, 377, 360 P.3d 1056, 1058 (2015)).

C.

The
The

District

Court Properly Applied The Statement Against Interest Hearsay Exception

district court

did not abuse

its

discretion

When

it

admitted Williams’s hearsay

statements as statements against Williams’s interest. Generally, the rule against hearsay bars the

admission of out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter asserted.
I.R.E. 802.

E

I.R.E. 801(0);

But the rules include a number of exceptions, including an exception for statements

against the declarant’s interest

when

the declarant

is

unavailable to

testify.

apply the statement against interest exception in a criminal case, the
that the statement is actually against the declarant’s interest

corroborating circumstances that

show

the statement

is

and

I.R.E. 804(b)(3).

district court

To

must ﬁnd both

that the statement is supported

by

trustworthy. I.R.E. 804(b)(3).

The test for the corroboration requirement is “Whether evidence

in the record corroborating

and contradicting the declarant’s statement would permit a reasonable person

t0 believe that the

statement could be true.” State V. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 243, 220 P.3d 1055, 1062 (2009). This
test puts the district court in the role

of a gatekeeper: the

person could believe the statement against interest
interest into evidence

is

and allowing the jury ultimately

district court

must ensure that a reasonable

true before letting the statement against

to “determine

where the

truth lies.” Li.

Here, the district court properly applied Rule 804(b)(3), including the corroboration
requirement. The district court found that Williams’s

10

was unavailable

to testify

and

that she

made

statements that were against her interest (TL, p.244, Ls.16-21, p.422, Ls.14-20.) Santos—Quintero

(E Appellant’s brief, pp.1 1-16.)

has not challenged those ﬁndings 0n appeal.

The record also supports

the district court’s ﬁnding that the state satisﬁed the corroboration

requirement. In response to Detective

parking
the

lot

when Fuhriman’s

Walmart parking

lot

and

Medrano asking Williams whether she was

at the

Walmart

items were stolen, Williams stated she and Santos—Quintero were in

that

he went t0 another car but she “didn’t

know What he took”—

implying, of course, that Santos took something. (TL, p.255, Ls. 14-21.) Williams’s statement

corroborated

by

(1)

was

Fuhriman’s testimony that he had his Ruger 9E stolen out of his car in that

same Walmart parking

lot

—

(TL, p.30, L.10

security footage recorded at

Walmart on

p.32, L.1); (2) Detective

day of the

the

theft

Hammer’s testimony

showed someone

that

get out of a dark-

colored Ford Excursion and then spend approximately one minute next to Fuhriman’s car (TL,
p.357, L.10

—

p.358, L.10); (3) Detective

Hammer’s testimony

Williams in the Ford Excursion 0n a separate occasion

Hammer’s testimony

that

(Tr.,

that

p.36 1 L. 1 8
,

he had a photograph of

— p.362, L6);

(4) Detective

he had a photograph of Santos—Quintero in the Ford Excursion 0n the

day before the theft (TL, p.360, Ls. 10-19, p.362, Ls.16-19); and
that additional items stolen

from Fuhriman were found

in the

(5) Detective

Hammer’s testimony

Ford Excursion (TL, p.359, L.3 —

p.360, L.1). Based 0n that corroborating evidence, a reasonable person could believe Williams’s

statement that she

took some

On

was With Santos—Quintero

unknown

objects

from someone

in the

Walmart parking

lot

When Santos—Quintero

else’s car.

appeal, Santos—Quintero asserts that the district court applied the

determine the admissibility of Williams’s statement. (Appellant’s
Santos-Quintero argues that the

Rule 804(b)(3). (Appellant’s

district

court read the

brief, p.15.) In his

wrong standard

brief, pp.1 1-16.)

t0

Speciﬁcally,

corroboration requirement out 0f

View, the district court found Rule 804(b)(3) was

11

was (A)

written in the disjunctive such that the state only had to prove the statement

against

Williams’s interest 0r (B) corroborated by other evidence. (Appellant’s brief, p.15.) The record

does not support Santos-Quintero’s View.

which Santos-Quintero

In the passage t0

(A) of Rule 804(b)(3)

is

refers, the district court

simply observed that part

written in the disjunctive, not that the entire rule

disjunctive. (TL, p.422, Ls.12- 1 3

(“Under (b)(3)(A), Inote

that the requirements

3(A) are in the disjunctive.”) (emphases added).) That observation

is

written in the

under

— under

(b)

is correct:

A statement that:
(A) a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would have made only if the
person believed it to be true because, When made, it was so contrary t0 the
declarant’s proprietary 0r pecuniary interest 0r had so great a tendency t0 invalidate

the declarant’s claim against

criminal

liability;

supported

is

(B)

someone

else 0r t0

expose the declarant t0

civil

0r

and

trustworthiness, if

by corroborating circumstances
it is

that

clearly

indicate

its

offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose the

declarant to criminal liability.

I.R.E. 804(b)(3)

district court

(emphases added).

observed that part (A)

is

Consistent With the plain language of Rule 804(b)(3), the
written in the disjunctive and then identiﬁed the requirement

in part (A) that Williams’s statement satisﬁed: “it tended to

liability.”

(Tr.,

The
View

expose the declarant t0

civil or criminal

p.422, Ls.8-21.)

district court’s other discussions

0f Rule 804(b)(3) also contradict Santos—Quintero’s

that the district court did not apply the corroboration requirement.

The

district court

read the

corroboration requirement t0 each party and asked each party Whether Williams’s statement

12

was

sufﬁciently corroborated.4 (TL, p.258,

L22 — p.259,

L.18, p.261, L.24

— p.263,

L.18.) In fact, in

response t0 Santos—Quintero’s argument that the corroboration requirement had not been satisﬁed,
the district court indicated

the

gun

stolen, that

The
at the

was

it

was

it

in

Mr. Fuhriman’s car.” (Tn, p.262, Ls.4-18.)

district court also

end 0f the

trial,

emphasized other corroborating

including that the “car

stolen”; the “detectives

that belonging t0 a

found Williams’s statement was corroborated by “testimony about

were able

was broken

to track

down

facts

when

it

explained

on September

into

the vehicle that

Ford Excursion”; the detectives “were able

15t

”g

was identiﬁed

t0 connect that

its

“the

ﬁndings

ﬁrearm

in the Video,

Excursion to Ms.

Williams”; “[i]tems Within that Excursion included items that were stolen from Mr. Fuhriman’s
vehicle”; and a photo 0f someone in the Ford Excursion taken a

match t0 the defendant.”

(T12,

p.458, L.5

— p.459,

ﬁnd that the record corroborated Williams’s
court implicitly

made

that

E, gg,

district court

was a “rough

So While the district court did not expressly

emphasizing corroborating

district court

discretion

its

.

.

.

434 P.3d 209, 213-14 (2019)

despite articulating a rationale

inconsistent with relevant legal authority” because the appellate court could infer

4

When

facts

discussing the corroboration requirement with

State V. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, 609-10,

(holding “the district court did not abuse

theft

statement, this Court can readily infer that the district

ﬁnding based 0n the

elsewhere in the transcript and the

both parties.

L.4.)

day before the

the district court asked each party about the corroboration requirement,

L.24 —

it

from the

asked Whether

ﬂ

was
p.262, L.3;
Tr., p.258,
(Tr., p.261,
While perhaps not the best word choice, the context 0f the district court’s
questions show that the district court was asking Whether the state had satisﬁed the corroboration
requirement rather than Whether the corroboration requirement was relevant. In response t0 the
district court’s question, the state listed the corroborating evidence that showed that it had satisﬁed
the corroboration requirement.
(TL, p.258, L.22 — p.259, L.18.) And, for his part, Santos
responded that the corroboration requirement was not “applicable” because the state failed t0 offer
the right kind of corroborating circumstances. (Tr., p.261, L.24 — p.262, L.16.) At no point in the
the corroboration requirement

L22 —

“applicable.”

p.259, L.3.)

discussion did any party (0r the district court) argue the legal relevancy of the corroboration

requirement t0 the admission of the evidence.

13

“context” that the district court also relied on a proper, unarticulated rationale); State V. Floyd, 159

Idaho 370, 372, 360 P.3d 379, 381 (Ct. App. 2015) (“[W]e should examine the record t0 determine
implicit ﬁndings

which would support the

Furthermore, given this was a bench

trial,

enunciate a separate ﬁnding 0f corroboration.

(1 1th Cir.

2005) (“There

is less

court’s order.”).

trial

there

ﬂ

was

less

of a need for the

United States

need for the gatekeeper

to

V.

district court to

Brown, 415 F.3d 1257, 1269

keep the gate When the gatekeeper

keeping the gate only for himself”). The result here speaks for

itself.

The

is

district court necessarily

found sufﬁcient corroboration such that a reasonable person could believe Williams’s statement
because the

district court

statement to

believed Williams’s statement, as evidenced by

ﬁnd that Santos—Quintero

But even

if the district court

stole

its

reliance

0n Williams’s

Fuhriman’s handgun. (TL, p.458, L.5 — p.459, L.6.)

misapplied the statement against interest exception, the error

was harmless. This Court only reverses a

district court’s decision

if the error “affect[s] substantial rights.”

I.C.R. 52. “Moreover, where, as here, the

was

the court, not a jury, even greater restraint

is

on the admissibility of evidence
ﬁnder of fact

applied in appellate review.” In re S.W., 127

Idaho 513, 519, 903 P.2d 102, 108 (Ct. App. 1995).

Any error in the

district court’s application

0f the statement against hearsay exception was

harmless as to the battery, assault, unlawful possession, and persistent Violator convictions because
this

Court can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Williams’s statement had no effect on the

district court’s

decision to

ﬁnd Santos—Quintero

guilty of those charges.

Idaho 209, 221, 245 P.3d 961, 973 (2010) (explaining an error

beyond a reasonable doubt that the

The
it

district court detailed the

error

evidence

made n0 mention of Williams’s

is

relied

on

14

to the verdict obtained”).

t0 convict Santos—Quintero

statement in explaining

State V. Perry, 150

harmless Where “the State proves

complained of did not contribute
it

E

on each count, and

Why it convicted Santos—Quintero 0n the

battery, assault, unlawful possession,

L8.)

and persistent Violator charges. (TL, p.445, L.19 — p.462,

In fact, the district court found that Williams’s statement

was

disputed issue: “that one element as t0 the ‘knowing that the property

relevant only t0 a single

was

stolen’ issue” for

grand

thefts (TL, p.270, Ls.1 1-16.)

Any

error

was harmless

on Williams’s statement

t0

as t0 the grand theft conviction given the district court’s reliance

ﬁnd Santos—Quintero

guilty 0f grand theft.

Idaho 288, 293, 955 P.2d 603, 608 (Ct. App. 1997) (explaining an error
indicates the result

complaint here

is

would not have been

that the district court failed t0

make

person t0 believe that the statement could be true.”

that

district court’s

E

district court that actually

error doctrine frowns

if “the verdict

Santos—Quintero’s only

a preliminary ﬁnding that the “evidence in

m,

would permit a reasonable

148 Idaho

at

243, 220 P.3d at 1062.

new trial” just

so

believed Williams’s statement whether, in the

0n spending

State V. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 724,

the harmless error doctrine

were unlikely

harmless

View, a reasonable person could believe Williams’s statement. (Appellant’s brief,

The harmless

endeavor.

State V. Miller, 131

asking this Court t0 “remand this matter t0 the district court for a

is

he can ask the same

p.17.)

is

different” Without the error).

the record corroborating and contradicting the declarant’s statement

In effect, he

C_f.

is t0

judicial resources

0n such a needless

215 P.3d 414, 444 (2009) (“The purpose of

prevent setting aside convictions for small errors or defects Which

to affect the result at trial.”). Thus,

any error here was harmless as

to all

0f Santos-

Quintero’ s convictions.

5

The

district court also

found Williams’s statement relevant because Williams “identiﬂied] the
name nor his identity

defendant by name.” (TL, p.270, Ls.1 1-12.) But neither Santos—Quintero’s
was a disputed issue at trial.

15

CONCLUSION
The

state respectﬁllly requests this

DATED this

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s judgment

of conviction.

19th day of October, 2020.

/s/

Jeff Nye

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
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